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Abstract  
Shape Security, a cybersecurity startup, employs a reverse proxy server system 
named Pegasus to protect their customers’ network traffic against attacks. Pegasus is 
configured by software in a feature-oriented paradigm, composing components of 
domain-specific code to tailor security policies for customers. Since Shape’s 
composition system has no developer-written way to enforce constraints between 
components, creating valid compositions is difficult. Our project addresses this issue by 
enabling a means for predicates to be written for components by the developers. This 
allows the use of programmable first order logic to validate that all components in a 
given policy satisfy the features’ predicates. The result is a new language which tests 
facts using logic to validate policies.  
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1. Introduction  
As the number of people using the Internet approaches 4 billion [1], cybersecurity 
is becoming increasingly important to today’s society. More data is being stored online 
than ever before, varying from hotel or airline reservations to healthcare and banking 
information. With personal information being accessed online more frequently, attacks 
with the intention of retrieving this information are increasing in frequency, as well.  
In an effort to prevent these attacks, Shape Security, a cybersecurity startup 
located in Mountain View, California, identifies and blocks malicious behavior from their 
clients’ network traffic without affecting legitimate users from accessing their information 
[2]. To help block attacks Shape Security uses software called Pegasus, a reverse 
proxy server system that consumes and sends out requests.  
The Pegasus system distinguishes malicious traffic from the traffic of legitimate 
users by using policies tailored for each individual customer. Customer policies are 
composed from a collection of individual components and are created by using Shape’s 
Policy Composer tool. Policy Composer composes policies in a feature-oriented 
paradigm by arranging and compiling components written in a domain specific language 
named DEX. When an attack occurs, Pegasus detects the malicious behavior using a 
DEX policy and blocks it, while simultaneously gathering information about the origin of 
the attack. This information allows Shape to improve the policy that blocked the attacker 
and improve their machine learning models, without blocking legitimate users. 
However, the major issue with Policy Composer is when there is the addition of 
new custom constraints, written as annotations in DEX components. This requires 
implementation of additional language support.The user of Policy Composer is currently 
not able to specify any additional constraints that must be met in a policy without adding 
this additional language support. 
The goal of our project is to develop a system that allows the Policy Composer 
users to add additional constraints to the policy. Our system, called Predicate-based 
Composer System (PCS), replaces the existing annotation system. With PCS, the 
component writer adds predicates (facts that are true about the specific component) in 
comments as part of the component. After a policy is composed, PCS allows a user to 
write first order logic statements to determine if the predicates written about each of the 
components in the composition can be made true by checking the satisfiability using 
Microsoft’s solver Z3. The end result is PCS, a new system implementing a language 
which tests predicates using first order logic to validate policies. 
The rest of this report is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the 
background information necessary to understanding our project; Chapter 3 explains the 
choices made in designing PCS, including determining the project requirements; 
Chapter 4 details the process behind implementing PCS and integrating it with Z3; 
Chapter 5 summarizes our conclusions, and Chapter 6 gives recommendations as to 
how our project can be advanced and maintained in the future.  
2. Background  
The sections that follow will describe Shape’s products that influenced our project 
and the technologies that were utilized to complete our project.  
2.1 Shape Security 
​This section gives an overview of Shape’s terminology and the internal 
architecture that influenced our project. 
2.1.1 Pegasus and Policy Composer 
​Pegasus and Policy Composer follow a feature oriented paradigm. Before going 
into detail about Pegasus and Policy Composer, we will define the concept of feature 
oriented programming.  
2.1.1.1 Feature Oriented Programming 
 
Feature Oriented Programming is a programming paradigm that focuses on 
developing features of a system, one feature at a time, until the desired system has 
been created [3]. A feature is a piece of system functionality that a user can identify. 
Different features require different capabilities, and different tools require different 
capabilities. A key goal is to allow third parties to add new features to existing products 
without modifying existing code. Although having many small components makes it 
possible to assign the least authority to each one, it over-burdens the programmer 
having to link each one. 
 
2.1.1.2 Pegasus 
Pegasus is a scriptable reverse proxy server that is responsible for detecting and 
eliminating bot traffic and malicious behavior between client endpoints and their servers. 
Pegasus processes both the pre and post network traffic to track down information in 
the event that malicious behavior is detected. This data is captured through flags which 
can be used to block new attacks. Pegasus rules are specified through policy 
configurations, which are created using the Policy Composer. 
2.1.1.3 Policy Composer 
Policy Composer is the tool which allows Shape to create policies specific to their 
customer’s needs and requirements. All policies are composed of many different 
components​. Each component is a specific group of customizable configurations that 
helps filter network traffic. All of these components are written in an internal 
domain-specific language (DSL) called DEX.  
Policy development consists of organizing a feature into a valid arrangement, 
providing the configuration arguments required by those features, and compiling the 
arrangement into a Pegasus policy.​ The Policy Composer is designed to achieve the 
following primary goals: 
1. To develop and maintain Pegasus policies as a list of domain-specific features, 
offering an abstract layer in which policies can be composed and maintained by 
domain experts. 
2. To build a library of policy feature components, which may be reused to create 
new policies. Feature components may be developed, tested and altered in 
isolation from other features. 
3. To provide a simplified configuration layer for Pegasus policies through which 
policies may be configured by a domain expert who is not necessarily familiar 
with DEX or the implementation of Pegasus policies in DEX. 
 
Figure 1 below outlines the steps necessary to create a policy with Pegasus. 
First, custom features are combined with standard features, loaded from a standard 
feature library. These are assembled into a policy feature composition. The features are 
arranged in this composition based on configuration parameters. A Pegasus Policy is 
then generated from this resulting composition. Our project will help aid this process by 
allowing more robust configuration parameters to be applied to the compositions. 
 Figure 1:​ Pegasus Policy Creation overview 
2.1.2 DEX  
​DEX is a DSL used to specify the behavior of the Pegasus reverse proxy server. 
DEX was developed at Shape and is used to create components of a policy for the 
composition of policies into features. Since there is currently no support for determining 
the interactions, intended or not, between different features, an extension to DEX must 
be created in order to pursue the idea of a sound composition algorithm. A problem with 
using DEX in its current state is the inability to determine the effects the feature would 
incur on top of the existing features. Thus, our project extends DEX to begin to address 
this problem. 
DEX programs are executed within an input environment that provides input data 
and external computation. The result of executing a DEX program in a given 
environment is a collection of flags and reported values. Executing the same program in 
different environments may produce different results as the input data and external 
computation may be different. 
There are two features of DEX that make it explicitly feature-oriented. ​The 
keyword ‘super’ provides access to identifiers defined in previous feature components in 
an arrangement of features. An arrangement of features is said to be valid if the data 
dependencies among the features are satisfied. Secondly, identifier names that start 
with underscore ( ​_ ​) are assumed to be local to the features in which they are defined. 
2.1.3 Athena 
​Athena is a suite of tools which include a parser, compiler, and interpreter for 
DEX. Composing a valid arrangement of features requires the DEX file to be parsed, 
compiled, and executed by Athena. As with most compilers, it has a lexer to scan the 
language for tokens, parses it into an AST, then eventually compiles.  
2.2 External Technology 
​In this section, we will discuss external technologies that we used to help in the 
design and implementation phases of our language. 
2.2.1 ANTLR 
 
​ANTLR (Another Tool for Language Recognition), is a tool that can automatically 
generate a parser from lexer and parser rules, specified in regular expressions and 
context-free grammars. ANTLR is especially useful since it can graphically show the 
parse trees from input text, which aids in ensuring the correct structure of a tree from a 
given grammar. This allows for the easy modification of the grammar, without having to 
refactor the parser by hand. These trees can be viewed in Appendix B. We used 
ANTLR to visualize the ASTs when designing our grammar. 
2.2.2 Z3 
 
SAT solvers attempt to determine if there exists an interpretation that satisfies a 
given boolean formula. They try to find a solution such that a boolean formula can 
evaluate to being true. As of 2007, SAT-algorithms have been able to solve problems 
consisting of thousands of variables and millions of symbols, though not in polynomial 
time due to their NP-Complete status [4].  
Modern SAT solvers have similar features, which include watched literals, 
learning mechanisms, deterministic and randomized restart strategies, cause deletion 
mechanisms, and smart static and dynamic branching heuristics. Since the SAT 
problem is NP-Complete, the additions of complexities within the formulae cause the 
runtime efficiency to increase non-polynomially.  
One popular and efficient solver is Z3, a modern Satisfiability Modulo Theory 
(SMT) prover developed by Microsoft Researchers [5,6]. Z3 takes logical formulas and 
expressions and assembles them into a single composition. Z3 then determines the 
satisfiability of the entire composition. 
There are three possible returns from checking the satisfiability of a Z3 
composition. The first return option is “sat.” ​Sat​ is returned if there exists a model that is 
satisfied for every defined formula in the composition, thus satisfiable. Next, “unsat” is 
returned if there is no possible model that can satisfy every formula, thus unsatisfiable. 
The final possible return is “unknown.” While rare to get unknown as a return, it occurs if 
Z3 cannot determine the behavior of a formula present in the composition. This is found 
when Z3 cannot determine the satisfiability of a formula.  
 Figure 2:​ ​Z3 Unknown Return Example 
 
Figure 2 shows an example when Z3 returns unknown. The first “(check-sat)” 
returns ​sat​ since Z3 can determine a valid solution. However, the second “(check-sat)” 
results in ​unknown​. Z3 cannot determine if there is a solution for both of the assertions. 
The satisfiability can be checked at any portion of the composition, which is useful for 
determining which formula caused an undesirable return. We use Z3 for determining if a 
solution is available to satisfy facts and first order logic statements made about a 
composition. 
 
  
3. Methodology  
​In the sections that follow, we outline the planning process we took in completing 
our project and creating Predicate-based Composer System (PCS). This includes our 
project requirements, the design of our new language, the grammar associated with that 
new language, the creation of our parser, creation of Z3 code, the creation of our 
compiler and testing. 
3.1 Project Requirements 
  
​In order to discover the most important and useful features to add to DEX, we 
consulted with many different teams to understand their perspectives and determine 
what would be the most beneficial. Currently, there are annotated metadata before 
modules, components, or bindings in a DEX file. These metadata store specific 
information about their respective part of the DEX file. 
 One of the major issues with the current system is that all the annotated 
metadata is hard coded, meaning personalized or custom annotations cannot be added. 
If there were a way that custom annotations could be allowed, this would make it easier 
for both the writers of DEX policy components and the Policy Composer team.  
The writers of the components would benefit from custom annotations since they 
would be able to add certain annotations to components that would have an internal 
meaning to their team. For example, if they wanted a few specific components to all be 
part of one group, they would be able to by labeling them and specifying how 
components with that label may interact.  
Once these components are written with the custom annotations, they would 
then be used by the Policy Composer team. The policy composers would benefit from 
these custom comments since there would be newer, more specific rules in place about 
which composition of components can make a valid policy. If there were a group of 
components where only one from the group could be chosen, it would be much easier 
for the Policy Composer team to identify that requirement and be able the pick the 
component from that group that best suits their needs for that specific policy, making the 
entire policy composing process easier.  
3.2 Design of Language 
 
​Once we determined the specific requirements needed, we were able to design a 
solution. Since the current system used an annotation system and all the annotations 
were hard coded, using a predicate system of logical facts would be a better approach. 
Our language, composed of these predicates, would be parsed into a series of First 
Order Logic statements. We visualized many examples of predicate statements and 
what their corresponding logical statements would be.  
As an example, one component may have the annotation “@Requires 
[​anotherComponent​],” which states that ​anotherComponent​ needs to be included in the 
composition of a policy if the annotated component is also part of the policy. The first 
order logic statement for this would translate to ​∀x,y. Component (x) ⋀ Requires(y) → 
Component(y)​. In this case, ​Component(x)​ evaluates whether ​x​ is a component in the 
current policy, and similarly, ​Requires(y)​ evaluates whether a component ​y​ is required. 
This statement would be evaluated, and if it evaluates to ​false​, then that specific policy 
composition would fail, since it requires the second component to also be present in the 
composition.  
After testing of our language, we were able to discover some unnecessary 
requirements that were present originally. PCS initially required a component ​x ​to also 
have a corresponding ​Component(x) ​for defining it as a component and usage in first 
order logic statements. Through type checking, we were able to remove the need to 
this. Instead of having to say explicitly in Z3 that ​x ​was a component as before, PCS 
was able to determine that it was a component based on its type. 
3.3 Creation of Grammar  
 
​After gathering requirements for our language, we created a grammar to define it. 
In order to test our grammar, we needed to be able to parse it and see the AST that it 
produces. To make this easier for us, we used ANTLR, an automatic top-down parser 
generator. In these planning stages, we were able to rapidly prototype a grammar and 
test the generated parser for correctness. To ensure the quality of our grammar, we 
wrote many tests using valid first order logic statements, which can be viewed in 
Appendix B. 
 
3.4 Creation of Parser 
Once we determined the requirements for our grammar, we created a parser for 
PCS. The parser needs to identify the required tokens from the DEX comments to 
correctly parse out the desired information. All the AST Nodes evaluate to a ​Formula​ or 
a ​Term​. Formulas are the predicates that are written directly in the DEX comments. 
Terms are the parts of the predicates that would eventually evaluate to a data type. The 
parser for PCS was written in Java. 
 
3.5 Creation of Z3 Code 
PCS uses Z3 as the tool to evaluate first order logic. Z3 has a Java API available 
for use, but there is not much documentation for using this API. Through manual 
experimentation, we found that the user can create Z3 code by calling the various 
functions for creating sorts, constants, and functions as needed for the composition. 
The downside for this API is that it is difficult to create formulas with quantifications, and 
all the first order logic we use contains at least one, and often multiple, quantifications. 
For our use, we would need to create the inner formula that was being quantified over 
first, then quantify over it. This proved to be difficult when introducing multiple and 
nested quantifications. 
The other option we pursued was to manually generate Z3 code through code 
generation. Using the style that was available on Rise4Fun, Microsoft’s website for 
learning Z3, PCS could generate sample logic examples and test them. Using the Z3 
Java API, PCS could pass this code as a string to create a solver based on the code. 
Then, PCS could evaluate the satisfiability of the solver. We used this method when 
integrating Z3 into PCS. 
3.6 Creation of Compiler 
Once we designed the parser and determined how we would integrate Z3, we 
developed a compiler for PCS. This compiler contained a list of the predicates being 
parsed from the DEX comments and compiled them to Z3 code. The compiler also 
needed to account for the various differences that Z3 code provided, such as defining 
sorts, as well as to accommodate to the way Z3 code is structured. This accomodation 
required declaration of predicate signatures as Z3 functions along with adding in the 
usages of the predicates as assertions. After generating the Z3 code, the PCS compiler 
attempts compilation using the Z3 Java API and returns the satisfiability to the user, as 
a boolean value, for the specific first order logic statement being tested. 
3.7 Testing 
Due to the unique nature of Z3 and its interaction with the parser and compiler, 
testing needed to be robust. We tested the parser and the compiler for PCS as its 
development progressed, verifying outcomes or modifying the code based on the 
results.  
The parser was tested to verify the ASTs were structured properly and only 
parsed valid tokens. We ensured these ASTs worked according to the precedence and 
associativity for all the operators included in our language. 
 Next, the compiler was tested extensively to ensure that errors were thrown 
when expected to correctly validate predicates, and translate to Z3 code. The compiler 
was also tested to cover all the errors that Z3 could provide, so that any Z3 error would 
be due to an ​unknown​ return.  All testing was done through a combination of JUnit tests 
and visual tests to confirm the structure of the parser trees.  
4. Implementation  
​The following sections detail the implementation of our API for compiling our 
language, Predicate-based Composer System (PCS), which also alludes to Policy 
Composer with the first two letters.  
4.1 Language design 
​This section describes the language we designed, as well as the design 
decisions behind it. 
 
4.1.1 Syntax 
The syntax for our language (which can be seen in detail below) was designed to 
make writing first order logic simple. The syntax also is designed such that anything that 
is written must be a ​formula​, or something that results to an assertion of a boolean 
formula or predicate, so that semantic analysis does not have to check for errors 
caused by inputs that are not directly translatable to Z3. The syntax also implies that the 
language is restricting input to only binary expressions; everything formula-wise is 
connected to another formula by connective operators (implication, biconditional, 
conjunction, disjunction). 
 
  
ormula → [ {FORALL | EXISTS} V . ] formula [ connective formula ]f + *  
                |   formula ˜  
                |  (  formula ) ′ ′ ′ ′  
                |  predicate  
                |  comparative  
→ (a )(a A 0 _)V − z − z − Z − 9 *  
onnective → [=> => AND OR]c  <   
redicate → pid tuplep  
                | bindingLevel #id :   
indingLevel → {thisComponent | thisModule | thisBinding}b  
d → Vi   
id → p A )(a A 0 _)( − Z − z − Z − 9 *  
uple → (  term [, term]  )t ′ ′  * ′ ′  
erm → stringt  
          | num  
          | thisComponent  
          | thisModule  
          | thisBinding  
          | true  
          | false  
          | #identif ier  
          | tuple  
dentif ier → Vi  
omparative → term op termc  
p → (< = = ! )o  >  <  >  =  =  
Notes: parenthesis represent sets, whereas curly brackets represent grouping. Brackets represent optionality. ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ 
are left-associative and have lower precedence than ‘=>’ and ‘<=>’ which are right-associative.   
4.1.2 Predicates 
Predicates, written in the comments of DEX files, can be used to assert facts 
about the AST Node they are attached to. The three levels of interest by which 
expressing facts about and between them would be useful are the following: 
Components in Policy Composer; Modules (analogous to a Class in Java); and 
(variable) Bindings in DEX. These varying ​levels​ of interaction have been implemented 
into PCS as a necessary means to record facts about them. The keywords 
“thisComponent”, “thisModule”, and “thisBinding” represent those levels, henceforth 
referred to as ​Binding Levels​. A predicate parsed from DEX AST Nodes must use one 
of the binding level keywords in order for logical quantification to be able to distinguish 
between the three domains of discourse. 
Predicates are also implemented to record facts about the specific ​level instance 
(a specific component, module, or binding) they are attached to. Our language offers 
terms: ​integers, strings, booleans, and specific references to other level instances, 
called identifiers (prepended with a ‘#’). Using these primitive data types as well as 
references to level instances allow a basis for allowing the statement of facts about level 
instances. 
 
4.1.3 First Order Logic Formulas 
​With the ability to state facts about level instances, being able to reason about 
them is required to be able to redefine validity in compositions. Quantification, via 
universal and existential operators (FORALL, EXISTS), as well as the ​variable​ used to 
quantify over, in addition to the connective operators, and comparative operations, allow 
a robust way to reason about the predicates in the features. By having test cases 
written in first order logic and translating them to our language, we were able to create 
this simplified language that could encapsulate the functionality required. Below is an 
example of a formula and its respective PCS equivalent. 
 
y. ∀x. Name(x, ) ∧ ∀z. ∀a. Name(z, ) ⇒ a y ∧ y “f indsHackers”∃ y a =  =   
EXISTS y. FORALL x. Name(x,y) AND FORALL z. FORALL a.  
Name(z,a) => a == y AND y = “findsHackers” 
 
4.2 Parser Design 
The following sections detail the design of the parser that was implemented. 
4.2.1 AST Nodes Class Structure and Design 
 
Figure 3:​ AST Nodes diagram (see Appendix A for UML) 
 
The AST Node classes were designed around ​Formula​ and ​Term​ due to the 
effect that each has; a formula can be asserted as being true, whereas terms resolve to 
a data type. The AST Nodes diagram can be seen in Figure 3 above, where Appendix A 
shows the complete UML diagram that includes the method descriptors for each 
member. In designing the parser, a functional approach was used considering the 
nature of programming languages being deterministic; note the deterministic typing of 
children for each node - a ​BinaryFormula​ has exactly two ​Formula​ as children, with one 
BinaryOperator​ enum. Also noteworthy is the usage of a ​Type​ enum - for terms with 
known types, the types are set in the constructor to their respective values, whereas 
terms like ​Identifiers​ are typed in the later stages of the compiler. Finally, PCS uses 
Shape Security’s own ​Functional Java​ library [7]  to further implement in a functional 
paradigm, using the types ​ImmutableList<T> ​to ensure immutability. 
4.2.2 Lexer Implementation and Design 
 
Figure 4:​ Lexer accessory classes 
​The lexer for the language was generated using JFlex, a library that allows the 
automatic generation of a lexer java class based on regular expressions and helper 
class definitions [8]. It first converts the regular expressions into a non-deterministic 
finite automata, then converts it to a deterministic finite automata which is then used to 
capture input text and map those captured expressions to tokens. JFlex was used to 
map (Figure 5) the ​TokenType​ Enums from Figure 4 to their respective regular 
expressions. JFlex also records the location, in an x and y coordinate system, allowing 
the tracking of location to be translated in our own ​Location​ file, used later in error 
reporting. The lexer has a simple API which generates a list of tokens from an input 
string, used in the parser. 
 
Figure 5:​ JFlex RegEx mapping 
4.2.3 Parser Implementation and Design 
 
Figure 6:​ Parser UML 
​As shown in Figure 6, the parser, designed alongside the AST Nodes, also 
operates in a functional way; every outcome is deterministic and the resulting AST is 
immutable, with direct typed mapping for children. The API, being ​parse​ and ​parsePred​, 
are designed to parse our language’s formulas and predicates, respectively, given a file 
and a string.  
The inner class ​Context​ is responsible for the methods involved in implementing 
the productions of the grammar, using a functional interface ​Parser​ which every 
production rule method implements. The interface is implemented in these methods by 
calling the functions ​loc​, ​locSymbol, ​and ​withSymbol​ to wrap the insides of the functions 
with a call to ​loc​ etc., so that they may repeat the task of recording production rules 
and/or locations in a stack data structure system. Figure 7 below illustrates an example 
use case.  
Figure 7:​ AST root node, binaryFormula 
Notice the return on line 95 being a call to ​locSymbol​, which manipulates the 
stack by adding the symbol “Binary Formula”, representing the production rule, to it.  
The root of every ​Formula​ AST is created by the ​binaryFormula ​method. This 
method implements the Shunting Yard algorithm to parse a formula as a binary 
expression [9]; with the connective operators, a formula is just a binary expression 
where ​AND ​and​ OR ​being lower precedence with left-associativity and ​IFF​ and ​IMP 
being higher precedence with right-associativity. The call to ​unaryFormula​ attempts 
parsing individual formulas separated by these operators, being Predicates and 
comparative ones along with a logical ​Not​ and grouped formulas within parenthesis. 
4.3 Semantic Analysis Design 
​The following sections detail the design of the multiple steps involved in semantic 
analysis, including usage safety, type checking, type inferencing, and variable binding 
management. All such functionalities are included in the same class for code 
generation, ​PCSCompiler​. 
4.3.1 Predicate checking 
​The set of all PCS predicates parsed from the DEX ASTs are analyzed first. The 
compiler is initialized with parsed predicates, in a  
Map<T, ImmutableList<Predicate>>​. This format allows a fundamental separation of 
each level instance’s PCS predicates, agnostic of the AST node mapped to it.  
There are many different data structures used to store information about the 
ASTs given, shown in Figure 8. They store data that is discovered through multiple AST 
visits, and since the ASTs are immutable, they are never modified, and all knowledge 
discovered must be recorded.  
Figure 8:​ ​Local fields in PCS Compiler, referenced in the following sections. 
​There are multiple steps that the predicates must go through to be passable for 
code generation. The format of each predicate must be consistent: 
1. The first argument of each predicate must be a ​BindingLevel​; arity must be > 0 
2. The BindingLevel keyword may be used once and only once. 
3. Each level instance must have its respective predicates use the ​same​ ​type​ of 
BindingLevel. 
4. Variables are not allowed in the predicates parsed from the DEX ASTs. 
5. Each AST in the map as generic T must have at least one Predicate as its value. 
6. Using the ID mapping syntax can only be used once per level instance. 
After this light checking is complete, PCS then must iterate through each level instance 
and determine if there was an explicit identifier mapping created for that level. If there is 
not, PCS generates a symbol to represent it, as Z3 will require it explicitly as a constant. 
PCS checks that each ID is unique between all level instances, and then place them 
into our ​identifiers​ map and ​symbolsByNode​ map. 
​Next, PCS must record the so-called method-descriptors of each predicate being 
used, as only their usage implies their existence. PCS populates our 
predicateSignatures​, ensuring there are no other predicates with the same name that 
are not​ congruent to the existing ones.  
Upon completion, PCS is able to say that the predicates are valid. Otherwise, an 
informative error, or series of them, are thrown for each violation, mentioning the 
specificity of the error and the name of the offending predicate(s). 
4.3.2 Formula checking 
​In order for a formula to be checked, there must be an instance of ​PCSCompiler​, 
for there can only be an instance for a successful check of given predicates (henceforth, 
factual predicates) ​by design (see Section 4.4 for the compiler design). This means that 
there are now data structures for recording the factual predicate signatures, the variable 
type mappings, and the level instances mapped to an identifier or generated symbol. In 
addition to these structures, the two visitors ​pre​ and ​post ​are created to traverse formula 
ASTs, shown in Figure 9 below. 
 
Figure 9: ​UML for Visitor Pattern with Traverser 
 
​The visitor pattern used to traverse the formulas is a variant on the standard 
visitor pattern - a ​Traverser​ class is used instead of having to implement every method 
in the interface. The Traverser takes in two visitors, ​pre​ and ​post,​ and visits a node by 
letting ​pre​ visit first, then the children would be visited by the traverser, finally ​post 
would visit. The Traverser is used in the checking of formulas by visiting given formula 
ASTs after predicate checking, with the visitors being initialized as anonymous 
inner-classes of the ​NopVisitor​ type. NopVisitor implements the Visitor interface but has 
entirely empty implementations. The implications of this pattern is that PCS can specify 
how to visit a particular node before ​and​ after visiting children, without having to 
implement any other of the visitor methods. 
The checking of formulas has multiple stages and requires robust techniques to 
deal with quantification. There are many complications that arise with expressing 
quantification, especially in the context of translating to code. The first complication that 
arises is chained quantification; the expression of multiple domains.  
Take, for example, the following formula: 
ORALL x. P (x) > (FORALL y. Q(y))F =   
This formula’s outer domain is whereas there is an inner domain  ⊆ Xx  ⊆ X  ∪ y ⊆ Yx
, where X and Y represent the set of all variables with types x and y, respectively. This 
statement can be generalized inductively: In this formula, if we introduced a third 
quantifier within the inner domain, its domain would expand to include all the parent 
domains; for any given formula F, if F has a quantifier, there must exist a domain D in F 
for which all formulas in F are in scope, and similarly for every sub-formula. A variable 
referenced outside a scope where it was defined is free; a variable referenced within a 
scope where it was defined is bound. This problem introduces the need for a scope 
capturing system. 
The next problem with quantification is typing. Examine the following FO formula: 
x y. P (x) > ∃ z a. Q(x, ) > a  ∧ z∃ =  y =  = y = x  
The problem with translating this formula into a computerized system is that a type is 
required for each variable quantified over, so that such a system can discover the 
respective domains with inferring type itself, as is the case with Z3. This formula has 
variables ​x ​and ​y​ which never even get used until the next quantified formula, until PCS 
enters a new scope, and the type can only be inferred from the way the factual 
predicates have defined ​Q(x,y)​.  
To address these problems we introduce the Symbol Table as a means to 
ensure proper scoping techniques are used, as well as two Traversers to handle type 
inferencing. Together, they check the validity of formulas, the scoping, and typing to 
ensure proper code generation. 
The following subsections describe what each visitor does for checking formulas. 
In all cases, PCS throws an error if a BindingLevel is used within a formula. 
4.3.2.1 Checking Quantifiers 
​The first step in visiting quantifiers is entering each variable into the symbol table, 
mapping their name to their type. As the rest of the AST is visited, the type will resolve 
in the table if the formulas are proper. PCS “enters scope” in the table, which 
increments the index of position in the table. Upon completion, the second 
NopTraverser exits scope, decreasing.  
4.3.2.2 Checking Predicates 
​There are myriad checks to be done for the predicates in a formula to assure 
they are well-formed. For each formula, PCS ensures the usage of every predicate, 
argument-type and arity-wise, is congruent to the factual predicates. PCS also ensures 
that every predicate referenced within a formula ​has​ a usage from the factual 
predicates. Finally, PCS also infers the types of variables having unknown types based 
on the way that they are being used in the factual predicates. 
 
4.3.2.3 Checking Comparative Formulas 
​Checking a comparison between two terms is a dynamic task. Depending on 
which operator is being used, the types of both sides must either conform to a set of 
types, or be inferenced. If the operator is one of (<,>,<=,>=), then both sides must be 
numbers, or if they are of unknown type, are inferred to be a number. Next, if the 
operator is (==, !=), then PCS cannot directly infer type; in both cases, if one side of the 
operator is of a known and valid type while the other side is unknown, PCS can infer 
that type to be that of the known type. PCS must throw an error if the types cannot be 
inferred, or if they do not match.  
At this stage, since all comparative operators with variables inside them are 
visited after a quantifier, the updating of a variable inside the symbol table must be done 
carefully. The table tries to resolve variables starting in the innermost scope first, 
working its way through parent scopes searching for a match. Ambiguities between 
variables of the same name and different scopes have no solution, as a uniquely 
identifiable system for variables, as they are known to the compiler, has not been 
implemented. 
4.3.3 The Need for a Second Traverser 
Although the design allows two visits per node, a second Traverser is still 
needed. By allowing code generation to have the knowledge of the discovered types, 
we must either build another anonymous inner class within the compiler so that it has 
access to the knowledge from the local fields (the variable-type mappings), or we put 
that knowledge inside the AST nodes themselves and add a method for code 
generation in each node class. We decided on the latter since the nodes should have 
knowledge of their discovered type. 
The second traverser sets the type of each variable, whose type was initially 
unknown, to the types discovered and recorded in the symbol table, additionally 
ensuring no free variables are allowed. 
4.4 Integration with Z3 
​When introducing first order logic to PCS, we needed to figure out how PCS 
would evaluate and enforce the logic statements that users would make. Being an SMT 
solver, Z3 allows assertions made through predicates and the first order logic 
statements in one composition. PCS could then evaluate the satisfiability of this 
composition and return it as a boolean value; true for ​sat​, false for ​unsat​, and throw an 
error in the rare instance that Z3 returns “unknown.” 
4.4.1 Translating to Z3 Code 
​Due to the unique nature of the Z3 language, PCS translates the content stripped 
from the DEX comments to Z3 code directly through code generation. Z3 requires 
knowledge of each variable’s type using it in certain cases, such as declaring a function 
or asserting a quantified expression. This is not something PCS requires when the user 
is writing their first order logic statements or predicates. Instead, our design allows us to 
look ahead at how the variable will be used to determine the type it must be. This 
allowed us to generate the correct Z3 code needed for each code generation portion, 
while maintaining simplicity from the user perspective.  
 
 
Figure 10:​ Z3 Code Generation Process 
 
The code generation process can be seen in Figure 10 above. It begins by 
creating the custom variable types (called “sorts” in Z3) for the three binding levels. 
Next, PCS creates all the constants that are used in the composition. These can include 
components, modules, bindings, integers, or strings. After this, the predicates are 
declared as functions using their signatures.  
Following this, all the predicates themselves are added as assertions. This is 
where the constants and functions are used. For a predicate such as 
@Firmware(thisComponent, 4, 5)​ where ​thisComponent ​has been named #c1, ​c1​ would 
be defined as a Component in the constants declaration section the assertion. The 
predicate Firmware is defined as a function that takes in a component and two integers 
while returning a boolean value, and the result would be ​(assert (Firmware c1 4 5))​. 
With this assertion, PCS is telling Z3 that this specific instance of Firmware is true. This 
continues for all predicates in the composition. Finally, PCS asserts the first order logic 
statements one by one, checking satisfiability each time for error reporting, using Z3. 
4.4.2 Running the Z3 Code 
​After generating the Z3 code, the next step is to run it to see if it was satisfiable. 
At this point, a function takes in the translated Z3 code with the assertion. Using the Z3 
Java API, a new context is created, from which the solver is created. Using a method 
provided by the API, the string containing the Z3 code is passed to this solver. 
Satisfiability is then checked using this solver, returning true for ​sat​, false for ​unsat​, and 
throwing an exception for ​unknown​ or, in the case where the compiler failed to catch 
errors, a Z3 Exception. 
4.4.3 Reporting Feedback from Z3 
A limitation of Z3 is being able to understand exactly what went wrong. A proof 
can be generated when a composition is unsat, but it does not contain any immediately 
useful information, as seen in Appendix C. Since PCS asserts the first order logic 
statements one by one, it can report back to the user which specific statement was not 
satisfied by the factual predicates, which at least provides some level of granularity. 
Feedback for the user is very important for fixing errors and unintended behaviors. 
4.4.4 Ambiguity with Z3 
​Using Z3 extensively throughout our project, the ambiguity present in it became 
more apparent. The main case where it is especially prevalent is when trying to check if 
items exist in the composition. Z3 will try to make satisfiable solutions every time. This 
can be detrimental because it will make assumptions about the existence of facts.  
For example, suppose we have a composition and one component requires 
another one to be present. The logic for this would be ​EXISTS b. FORALL a. 
Requires(a, b). ​From this logic we are stating that component ​a​ requires component ​b​ to 
be present in the composition. However, Z3 will not check this. Instead, Z3 will assume 
that ​b​ does exist in the composition somewhere. Due to this assumption, it is very 
difficult to check that the desired component is present.  
More challenges arise from this assumption and logic as well. This assertion will 
not be checked unless an ​(assert (Requires a b))​ is present in the composition. In order 
for this assertion not to cause an error previously in Z3, ​a​ and ​b​ must both be defined. 
From here, it will check the assertion and be able to satisfy it, since both exist. 
Essentially, the logic will not be reporting back that the component is not present. 
Instead, Z3 will be checking it by producing an error when the component has not been 
defined and not by the logic, which is undesirable.  
 
4.5 Compiler Design 
The following section outlines the high-level design of the compiler for PCS: the 
internal workings of what happens when it is used to compile Z3 code, and how. 
Figure 11: ​UML for PCSCompiler 
Figure 11 shows the simple API for using PCS Compiler: the constructor, where 
one provides a mapping between each instance level and an ImmutableList<Predicate> 
representing all the predicates attached to their respective instance level’s AST Node, 
parsed from the comments of that node; the ​addFormula​ method that takes in a parsed 
Formula​, and the ​checkThat​ method that interfaces with the Z3 API to check 
satisfiability or errors. 
The use case for the API is as follows: a user must create an instance of the 
compiler with parsed predicates and their map keys, representing level instances, and 
check for compilation errors. If there are no errors, the compiler has produced Z3 code 
for the factual predicates, and the user may then proceed to add formulas. To check if 
these factual predicates compile to Z3 and to check satisfiability, the user must call 
checkThat. 
To check formulas, a user calls ​addFormula​ with a parsed formula and if it 
returns true, then the formula has passed both compilation and Z3 satisfiability and has 
its respectful Z3 code added to ​code​. False indicates an ​unsat​ status, and compiler 
errors are thrown otherwise. 
The design of this API was intended to allow the finest grain of error reporting - 
all the predicates must be compiled at once to check if they are valid ​together​ in the 
domain of facts that have been asserted. Errors will surface for each compilation error 
found for the predicates. Additionally, the user has the power to tell which formulas, if 
any, have failed compilation or satisfiability. Since a program is unsat if ​one​ assertion is 
unsat​, the best error reporting will indicate so at the individual formula granularity. 
4.6 Testing 
The following sections outline how the parts of the compiler were tested. 
4.6.1 Lexer testing 
To thoroughly test a lexer, we tested that a valid, respectful token was created for 
each token possible. We also tested that white-space did not get parsed. Figure 12 
below shows a sample of the test cases we ran.  
Figure 12: ​Lexer test cases for expected token types and whitespace ignorance 
​The lexer tests tokenize given input texts and assert that the type of the parsed 
token is the intended type. The whitespace tests on line 86 do the same operation, 
asserting that the whitespace does not interfere with tokenization.  
4.6.2 Parser testing 
​Test cases for parsing is difficult, because it is not easy to automatically confirm 
that the structure of the ASTs are as expected. We visually confirmed the structure of 
the trees to be valid via a visiting printer, and also tested whether input should parse. 
Example test cases are shown in Figure 13 below. 
Figure 13:​ Parsing test cases  
4.6.3 Compiler Testing 
The compiler was tested through factual predicates, formula, and satisfiability 
assertions. We tested whether the compiler threw errors when expected, or whether the 
Z3 compilation result was expected. We tested every type of error accounted for in the 
compiler. The goal for the compiler is to never allow a Z3 exception unless for the 
semantic failures caused by an ​Unknown ​return status. We are unaware of any possible 
exceptions not caught by PCS Compiler, however there may still be unresolved matters. 
Sample test cases are shown in Figures 14 and 15 below. 
Figure 14: ​Testing factual predicates 
Figure 15: ​Testing Formulas 
​Level instance predicates are simulated via adding predicate PCS code text and 
registering them by calling ​parseNode​. Formulas are tested by creating only one, 
similarly by calling ​checkCompile​ to run all the PCS code for compilation, where 
parseFormula​ then checks for Z3 compilation. The tests check every possible error we 
have formulated in the previous sections, as well as testing arbitrary valid formulas. 
  
5. Conclusion 
​Shape Security protects its customers by employing Pegasus, a reverse proxy 
system that is located between the end user and the origin server. Pegasus 
distinguishes between malicious traffic and legitimate users through the use of policies, 
which are composed of many different components, and created through Policy 
Composer. Since the current system is not robust for policy customization, there is a 
need for a better way to specify how policy components interact with each other to 
create a valid policy composition. Currently, there are a handful of built-in annotations 
that component writers could include in the component being written, but no easy way 
to specify custom annotations.  
We designed and developed Predicate-based Composer System (PCS) to 
address this issue by making a more flexible and customizable system for components 
of a policy. With PCS, predicates can be defined for components, where predicates are 
like facts that are true for a specific component. Using these predicates, PCS uses first 
order logic formulas to determine whether the logic is valid for all the predicates 
asserted by the components present in the policy, by assessing the composition’s 
satisfiability using Z3.  
Certain first order logic statements are applied to every component in every 
policy, as logic is the basis for a valid policy. Other first order logic statements can be 
created or customized based on the requirements from the customer for that specific 
policy, without needing to ask the component writers to implement the functionality to 
the specific component. If the first order logic statements cannot be satisfied using Z3, 
PCS produces an error to inform the user which statement was unable to be satisfied. In 
general, PCS is a more extensive way to compose new policies through its use of first 
order logic and Z3 to determine if a policy composition is valid. 
  
6. Future Work 
​In order for Predicate-based Policy System (PCS) to be used, it will need to be 
integrated with Policy Composer. The sections below details how PCS can be improved 
and integrated in the future. 
6.1 PCS Performance Optimization 
While PCS works based upon the tests that we have written, more testing to 
further understand the semantic translations to Z3 needs to be done; it is often difficult 
to translate a requirement into the logic needed to express the composer constrictions 
required. 
Additionally, the compiler need optimizations - there are multiple iterations over 
ASTs that could be reduced to lower the runtime efficiency. The symbol table system 
needs to also be able to include separate scopes per level in an AST, instead of 
assuming every quantifier is either the root scope or contained in. 
6.2 UI Mockups for Integration 
 
​Once our language was fully implemented, we began creating UI Mockups to 
visualize how PCS would interact with Policy Composer when integrated. Future work 
would be to use these mockups to commence integration. 
The information needed in the mockup was the required predicates for every 
component no matter which policy they belong to, the optional predicates for when the 
Policy Composer users want to create additional predicates for a specific policy, and 
error reporting for when a predicate was violated. We created mockups for how we 
envision integration with Policy Composer would work, along with how errors would be 
reported to these mockups.  
6.2.1 Mockup For Policy Composer Integration 
First, the UIs would be stored in a new “Predicate Logic” tab in the top bar of the 
Policy Composer front end UI, as seen in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 16:​ Predicate Logic Tab Mockup 
 
Figure 10 below shows a Policy Composer UI to ensure required predicates are 
satisfied while being able to add or create optional ones if desired. In this UI, we present 
the user with all the “default predicate logic statements” that are always applied to every 
composition. They contain the logic and a description to go along with the logic. Directly 
below this is the pre-defined “optional predicate logic statements.” These are predicate 
logic statements that are commonly used in compositions, but do not apply to every 
composition. Again, the logic and description for the logic is present. These statements 
can be toggled “on” and “off” based on whether or not the Policy Composer user wants 
to apply it to their composition.  
The final box (“optional predicate logic template”) is a template available for the 
user to write in their own statements that must be true for the composition. Similar to the 
optional predicate logic statements, this template contains a description, the logic, and a 
checkbox on whether it is applied to the composition. Clicking the “+” icon below this 
allows for the user to produce another template for adding more custom statements. 
 
 
 
Figure 17:​ Predicate Logic UI Mockup 
6.2.2 Mockup For Error Reporting 
​Reporting errors to the user is very important when introducing a new system. 
Due to the issues with Z3 feedback discussed in Section 4.4.3, error reporting should be 
as informative as possible. 
  
Figure 18:​ Predicate Logic UI Errors Mockup 
Figure 11 above is a mockup of an invalid policy composition being reported to 
the policy composer user. The text of the predicate logic statement that was not 
satisfied turns red and informs the user that it was not satisfied, with some additional 
information based on if it is a default, optional, or created statement. The default 
statement error informs the user to review the composition. Building off this, the optional 
logic statement error asks the user to review that it is valid for the composition, since it 
can be toggled off. The error for the created logic statements asks the user to review 
the composition, the logic, and verify it applies. The varying messages are intended to 
remind the user what to check specifically, since there are more areas to check when 
adding customizability.   
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Appendix A: UML Diagrams 
AST Node Classes 
 
Parser Classes 
 
 
Appendix B: Parsing Test Cases with ANTLR 
 
Description Test Screen Cap 
Valid 
Firmware 
FORALL a b c. 
Component(a) & 
Firmware (a,b,c) 
=> b <= c 
Firmware 
condition is 
satisfied in 
each 
component 
FORALL a. 
EXISTS b c. 
Component(a) 
=> 
Firmware(a,b,c)  
 
There is a 
version 
between b 
and c 
EXISTS d. 
FORALL a b c. 
Firmware(a,b,c) 
=> (b <= d) & (d 
<= c) 
 
Unique 
component 
only shows 
up once 
FORALL x y. 
Component(x) & 
Component(y) 
=> (EXISTS a b. 
Id(x,a) & Id(y,b) 
& ~(a==b))| 
x==y 
 
Displaying a 
date from a 
binding in 
the UI 
cannot 
appear as a 
different 
type 
FORALL a t p. 
Binding(a) & 
DisplayAs(a,t) & 
DisplayAs(a,p) 
=> t==p 
Component 
cannot be 
present if 
any of the 
components 
in the list 
are also 
present 
FORALL x y. 
Component(x) & 
Conflict(y) => 
~Component(y) 
 
Requires 
another 
component 
to be 
present 
FORALL x  y. 
Component(x) & 
Requires(y) => 
Component(y) 
 
Appendix B - Table 1:​ Test Cases with Screen Captures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Test Extensive Tests (​Bold​ fails) 
FORALL a b c. Component(a) & 
Firmware (a,b,c) => b <= c 
FORALL a b c. (Component(a)) & Firmware 
(a,b,c) => b <= c ; 
 
FORALL a b c. (Component(a) & 
Firmware(a,b,c)) => b <= c ; 
 
FORALL a b c. (Component(a) & 
Firmware(a,b,c) => b <= c ); 
 
FORALL a b c. Component(a) & 
Firmware(a,b,c) => (b <= c ); 
 
FORALL a b c. ((Component(a) & 
Firmware(a,b,c)) => (b <= c )); 
 
(FORALL a b c. ((Component(a) & 
(Firmware(a,b,c)))) => ((b) <= c )); 
 
((FORALL a b c. ((Component(a) & 
(Firmware(a,b,c))))) => ((b) <= c )); 
FORALL a. EXISTS b c. 
Component(a)  => 
Firmware(a,b,c)  
(FORALL a. ((EXISTS b c. ((Component(a))) 
=> (Firmware(a,b,c))))); 
 
(FORALL a. ((EXISTS b c. ((Component(a)))) 
=> (Firmware(a,b,c)))); 
EXISTS d. FORALL a b c. 
Firmware(a,b,c) => (b <= d) & (d 
<= c) 
(EXISTS d. FORALL a b c. (Firmware(a,b,c)) => 
((((b)) <= d) & (d <= (c)))); 
 
((EXISTS d. FORALL a b c. (Firmware(a,b,c))) 
=> ((((b)) <= d) & (d <= (c)))); 
 
 
FORALL x y. Component(x) & 
Component(y) => (EXISTS a b. 
Id(x,a) & Id(y,b)  & ~(a==b))| x==y 
(FORALL x y. ((Component(x) & Component(y)) 
=> (((EXISTS a b. ((Id(x,a)) & Id(y,b))  & 
(~(a==b))))| x==y))); 
 
(FORALL x y. ((Component(x) & 
Component(y))) => (((EXISTS a b. ((Id(x,a)) & 
Id(y,b))  & (~(a==b))))| x==y)); 
 
(FORALL x y. ((Component(x) & 
Component(y)))) => (((EXISTS a b. ((Id(x,a)) & 
Id(y,b))  & (~(a==b))))| x==y); 
 
 
 
 
FORALL a t p. Binding(a) & 
DisplayAs(a,t) & DisplayAs(a,p) 
=> t==p 
FORALL a t p. Binding(a) & (DisplayAs(a,t) & 
DisplayAs(a,p)) => t==p; 
 
FORALL a t p. Binding(a) & DisplayAs(a,t) & 
DisplayAs(a,p) => (t)==p;  
 
 
FORALL x y. Component(x) & 
Conflict(y) => ~Component(y) 
 
(FORALL x y. (Component(x) & Conflict(y)) => 
(~(Component(y)))); 
 
(FORALL x y. (Component(x) & Conflict(y))) 
=> (~(Component(y))); 
FORALL x  y. Component(x) & 
Requires(y) => Component(y) 
(((FORALL x  y. (Component(x) & 
(Requires(y))) => Component((y))))); 
 
(FORALL x  y. (Component(x) & 
(Requires(y)))) => Component((y)); 
Appendix B - Table 2:​ List of Extensive Tests 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C: Z3 Proof when Unsatisfiable 
 
 
 
 
